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Glossary we attribute the capacity of aesthetic judgment to
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Neuroaesthetics – A research paradigm
whose proponents attempt to learn more
about the human aesthetic experience by
studying the brain, in particular the
perceptual system.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction
What is required for aesthetic experience to take
place? Who or what is capable of having aesthetic
experience and of judging something to be beauti-
ful? A wild wolf surveying the canyon floor for
small moving prey is in an exquisitely sensitive
perceptual state, but he is not having an aesthetic
experience. Is aesthetic experience solely the
province of humans, then? Is there no animal
model of our appreciation of art? Or what about
the nest of the bowerbird, discussed by Ernst
Gombrich in his study of the psychology of deco-
rative art? Gombrich compares the sorts of repeti-
tive patterns and color arrays with no underlying
meaning beyond their visual impact found in dec-
orative art with products found in the animal
world. He points to the example of the nest of
the bowerbird, known for creating highly deco-
rated nests made complex (and beautiful?) with
shells, brightly colored objects such as berries,
feathers, flowers, and even found items of human
manufacture such as plastic or glass. Not only does
the male bird spend many hours building, creating,
and crafting the nest, but he will also replace
moved or disturbed elements of a seemingly inten-
tional design. Moreover, each bower built is
completely original and reflects decisions made
by its creator on the type, color, and structural
array of objects collected for decorating the nest.
Should we say that these birds are artists? Should
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Encyclopedia of Consciouthe female bowerbirds who select their mate on the
basis of the brilliance of his bower?
In the human realm, our aesthetic drive seems
to predate history at the very least. Paleolithic
people imprinted cave walls with figures, symbols,
and what seem to be projected forms of internal
images. It is not known whether the underground
paintings at Chauvet cave or Lascaux, France, are
truly works of art, products of an ‘aesthetic
impulse,’ or just primitive attempts at magical
wish-fulfillment, but they clearly arouse aesthetic
responses in modern-day viewers who marvel at
their beauty and elegance. Principled reflection on
the concept of the aesthetic response and on its
relation to cognition probably starts with the
ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle,
who each had something to say about aesthetics
(from the Greek, aisthanomai and aesthetikos, per-
ception or apprehension through the senses). Plato
holds beauty itself in the highest regard, as an
eternal aspect akin to virtue and truth. However,
Plato has something quite different to say about
the experience of beauty as effected through per-
ceptual activity, and we get a sense of his displea-
sure by noting his censure of those who would
attempt to play with our sensory intake and
manipulate the quality of perceptual experience –
artists – who deal in images, representations, and
analogies, but not, as Plato would claim, unfiltered
truth. Unlike Plato, Aristotle sees a place for the
arts and the development of aesthetics as worth-
while imitations of life and its passions: The arts
can provide an occasion for katharsis, a purging of
emotions through vicarious experience.
The field of aesthetics comes into its own in the
eighteenth century when Alexander Baumgarten, a
German rationalist philosopher, resurrected the
term ‘aesthetics’ from the earlier Greek usage to
serve as the label for a philosophical discipline deal-
ing with knowledge from sensory perception.
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Author's personal copyAnother eighteenth-century thinker, Immanuel
Kant, realized that sensory experience, in all its
complex and concept-defying richness, requires its
own methods of discovery and analysis. Turning his
thinking to aesthetics, Kant distinguishes three types
of aesthetic, or reflective, judgments based on feel-
ings of pleasure or displeasure: judgments of the
agreeable, judgments of the beautiful (or of taste),
and judgments of the sublime. In deeming some-
thing agreeable, one is merely attributing to it a
subjectively determined pleasure-producing quality.
We do not expect others to find it so; we would call
something agreeable ‘beautiful’ only in this limited
and nonbinding sense. Notions of the sublime go
beyond the concept of beauty: The sublime is awe-
inspiring, fearsome, overwhelming. Turning to judg-
ments of beauty, Kant mentions four aspects that are
essential to such judgments: (1) disinterested plea-
sure (we find pleasure in the object because it is
beautiful, not the other way around); (2) universal
validity (but this universality is not based on any
kind of rigid conceptual categorization); (3) some-
thing he calls ‘purposeless purposiveness’ (the result
of ‘free play’ of the imagination); and (4) necessity (a
subjective attribution of beauty exemplifies how the
object ought to be judged).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Aesthetic Perception
Aesthetic judgments, although grounded in sen-
sory cognition, differ in the role they play in
human experience. Beyond enabling the attribu-
tion of properties such as shape, color, odor, tex-
ture, and so forth to particular things, aesthetic
judgments allow us to ascribe meaning and value
to experiences. Not only is a sample of Chateau
Lafite wine pungently fragrant, purplish red, tart,
and cool, a sip of it delivers a highly complex blend
of aromas and flavors that can be named only by
comparison to mundane substances: oak, cherry,
smoke, chocolate. The experience of the connois-
seur supervenes on the base elements of taste and
smell, but there is more: He transforms these
elements into something new through the prism
of his cognitive stock – his knowledge that the
wine is rare, outrageously expensive, and coveted
by experts – along with his memories of having
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Encyclopedia of Consciousdrunk other rare wines and his feelings of antici-
pation fueled by imagining the pleasure to come.
Qualities in nonhuman creatures that attract
mates (or in some cases frighten away predators)
may be compared with those qualities which, at
first glance, comprise human beauty or attractive-
ness. But again, at least in the case of humans, the
aesthetics of beauty require more than recognition
of forms and sounds and perception of colors and
odors. The appreciation of beauty involves con-
scious activity in which areas of the brain are
engaged in the production of a complex mental
state – a hybrid of sensoryand cognitive components.
Recent research on the facial characteristics we con-
sider beautiful has found that symmetric faces are
judged to be more beautiful than asymmetric ones.
Of course, perfect faces can be boring, and introdu-
cing asymmetries or flaws can improve on perfection.
We call a single dark mole on one side of a woman’s
mouth a ‘beautymark,’ but correct the asymmetry by
placing amatchingmole on the opposite side, andwe
see the pair as a sort of disfigurement. The single
mole reorganizes our perception of her face by
accentuating certain features and drawing attention
away fromothers.Our understanding of howwe read
emotions from faces is also progressing nicely, and
much of this information is relevant to the artistic
expression of emotion through the depiction of faces,
such as the Mona Lisa’s intriguing smile. By steadily
understanding the processes behind our perception
of emotion and attractiveness in faces, we can both
come to understand those judgments and teach
the artist the dimensions along which faces vary.
Many visual artists, particularly painters of the
Impressionist and post-Impressionist periods of the
late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, are
interested in understanding and exploiting thework-
ings of the eye and brain in perceiving light and
constructing colors.Aesthetics and Neurophysiology
The early findings of the Gestalt psychologists
demonstrate that our visual systems will complete
gaps in lines and corners, fill in colors, and so on in
order to produce a more unified and coherent
perceptual end-product. We have reached the
point where we can provide neuroscientific
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Author's personal copyexplanations of these Gestalt phenomena, some-
thing that seems to invite the possibility of our
gaining a neuroscientific understanding of more
complicated perceptual events such as those
involving the perception and aesthetic apprecia-
tion of works of art. The new science of neuroaes-
thetics investigates perception and the way the
brain generates aesthetic responses. How are
forms and patterns processed? Are certain forms
‘preferred’ over others by the perceptual system?
Neuroaesthetics has produced two early theories
of how the brain generates aesthetic responses.
Semir Zeki has developed a theory of aesthetics
that appeals to neurophysiological structures and
events in the human brain, and he goes some dis-
tance beyond well-established claims that they are
essential in expounding or expanding traditional
ideas about painting as an art. Zeki asserts that
artists, because they study the brain and the
mechanisms of perception and the causal avenues
for producing aesthetic responses, are themselves
neurologists.Where a painter differs from a scientist
who studies visual perception is inmethodology, not
in subject matter, according to Zeki. Viewing the
work of visual artists from Zeki’s perspective pro-
vides a deeper insight into why an artist does what
he does in constructing a painting, why he chooses
the exact shapes, colors, and specific juxtapositions
of painterly elements such as line, shading, perspec-
tive, and so on. The artist is exploring, exploiting,
challenging, and manipulating the brain’s ability to
absorb and interpret sensory data in novel, unex-
pected, and exciting ways. Therein lies the basis of
the aesthetic response; not only does the spectator
see shapes, lines, and colors of various tints and
shades when he or she looks at a painting, but
there is also the essential component of any success-
ful work of art that is the production of a type of
mental state that outstrips ordinary perception.
Great, or even good, art will arouse subtle, or per-
haps strong, emotions. It will jostle and arousemem-
ory and effect numerous associations with other
mental states. It can induce a sense of joy or of
infinite sorrow; it may even lift the spectator to
heights of spiritual or existential transcendence.
And the artist accomplishes all this without electro-
des, probes, or chemicals. The artist, in Zeki’s view, is
a virtuoso scientist using instruments much simpler
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Encyclopedia of Consciouand less invasive, but requiring great ingenuity and
immense perspicacity in their application.
Zeki emphasizes the analogy between the way
that our perceptual systems function to extract the
more permanent patterns in the flow of energy
reaching them with the way that artists often strive
to capture the essence of objects they depict.
Ramachandran argues further that the representa-
tional artist is presenting us with a sort of carica-
ture of the represented object, in which certain
perceived features have been exaggerated while
other features have been deemphasized. A skilled
artist can evoke a particular person or place with a
few deftly drawn lines, using the art of caricature
to capture a sort of ‘formal essence’ of the repre-
sented person or thing. What we are able to see
through such caricatures depends, in scientifically
describable ways, on the structure of our visual
system and its connections to the different mem-
ory systems. Much of visual art can be captured by
rules of form, many of which are derived from the
findings of the Gestalt psychologists, such as sym-
metry, balance, and grouping of forms. Artists
combine these basic form-primitives in new and
evocative ways, according to Ramachandran.Consciousness and Aesthetic
Experience
What is the connection between consciousness and
aesthetic experience? Are aesthetic experiences
necessarily conscious, for instance? While it may
be no easier to show the necessity of consciousness
to aesthetic experience than to any other sort of
experience or mental function, aesthetic experi-
ences are often included in lists of paradigm con-
scious experiences. It is also interesting to note
that several of the classic puzzles that theorists of
consciousness are tasked to solve either make ref-
erence to aesthetic reactions themselves, or to
their essential ingredients, such as the ability to
perceive color, as in Frank Jackson’s ‘Mary case.’
Mary is a future neuroscientist who knows about
all of the physical processes involved in human
color vision, but has never seen any colors other
than black and white (she is kept in a special room,
only given certain foods, etc.). When Mary is
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Author's personal copyfinally allowed to see colors, she seems to learn
something new, that is, what it is like to con-
sciously experience red. But she already knew
about all the physical events involved, and so
there appears to be a problem for theorists who
claim that the mind is physical, in that the con-
scious experience of red seems not to be among the
physical events that we agreed initially that Mary
knew. Another classic puzzle, Dennett’s ‘Chase and
Sanborn problem,’ involves something close to
aesthetic perception – in this case, coffee tasting.
Chase and Sanborn have been brewing their coffee
for decades, but neither of them likes the taste any
longer. Chase says that his taste preferences have
not changed over time, but that the way the coffee
tastes to him has changed. Sanborn says that the
coffee tastes the same to him, but his preferences
have changed so that he no longer enjoys that
flavor. Dennett claims that no physicalist theory
can capture the difference between Chase and
Sanborn, because he believes that the taste and
the preference for the taste cannot be teased
apart. Delving further into the distinction between
perception and preference, andwhether and how it
might be made, will also reveal information of
interest about art. Indeed, to pose a final neuroaes-
thetic theory of the experience of art, the scientist
may have to wait until these more basic ontological
questions are answered.
But must aesthetic experiences be conscious?
Could there be a zombie artist, for instance, a
being who looks and acts just like a normal person,
creating and appreciating works of art but not
capable of consciousness? But, is not the whole
point of creating works of art to produce those
special conscious experiences? What is the point
of his making these objects, we want to know. We
might look more closely into our normal aesthetic
experience for unconscious events that are at least
important to our experiences, if not outright com-
ponents of it. One candidate for an unconscious
aesthetic response is the sort of case where, for
example, one realizes some time after seeing a
film an interesting subplot of which he had not
been conscious aware on first seeing the film. In
more complicated artworks, especially of the narra-
tive variety such as the novel, how the author
handles the main plot and its relations to various
subplots is an important part of howwe aesthetically
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who only later fully appreciates the work, the brain
seems to be continuing the attempt to understand
the artwork all on its own. Certainly many artists
have reported being inspired by dreams, although
it is debatable whether dreams themselves are a
type of conscious state.
Consciousness relates to aesthetic experience
at two basic points, which then can permute and
recombine to produce more complex aesthetic exp-
eriences. The first point of contact concerns the
artist’s act of creation, including the intentions spe-
cifying how the artwork will be made and what the
end result will (ideally) be like. The second point of
contact concerns the conscious perception of the
finished artwork by a human perceiver. One of the
first recombinations of these basic ingredients
occurs in the brain of this viewerwhen she considers
the intentions of the artist. There is also the fact that
many artists attempt to emulate the mind of a
viewer, or often more specifically, viewers of differ-
ent sorts: critics, peers, average people, etc. So the
viewer is modeling the intentions of the artist, while
the artist is modeling the understanding of the
viewer. This sort of activity falls under the category
of ‘theory of mind’ or ‘mindreading’; in this case
intentions and perceptual states are modeled.
Another kind of reading we do of other people
occurs when we watch their intentional activities
while employing mirror neurons to understand
their actions. Rizzollati, who is the first to attribute
the familiar imitative behavior we observe not just in
monkeys but in humans as well to these specialized
‘mirror neurons,’ notes that mirror neurons are at
their most effective when the observer is face-to-
face with the observed. Stafford suggests that this
fact explains why so many visual artists focus on the
face as the center of a work, sometimes presenting
the viewer with nothing but a face. Here the artist
is playing up the natural emphasis on frontality
and the intuitive recognition that some of our most
deep-seated reflections about who people are, about
our own identity, arise from contemplating the face
of the other, or of the face in the mirror.
Several neurological patients have recently been
described who have become obsessed with art after
brain lesions, or repeated epileptic seizures, very
often in the temporal lobes. These obsessions typ-
ically focus on a particular medium, often painting
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to spend every waking moment creating and
performing art, and some of the patients have
become quite accomplished and are even able to
sell paintings for high prices, or impress music
critics with their composition or performances.
Apparently, these patients find thinking about
and creating works of art extremely rewarding, so
much so that they sometimes forget to eat while in
the throes of creation. This suggests an explanation
for aesthetic responses that relates them to con-
sciousness in general. There is little point in
assembling the expensive and complicated
machinery needed to achieve consciousness if we
do not trouble ourselves to use it. Perhaps because
conscious thinking requires effort, there needs to
be a reward for engaging in conscious thought.
Nature’s way of enticing us toward conscious activ-
ity, according to this view, is to make conscious
experience itself rewarding. Contemplation of the
contents of consciousness is not, as we might have
thought, basically neutral, with any emotional
response being traceable to the particular contents
of that mental state and not to consciousness itself,
but rather pleasurable in itself. Sometimes, natu-
rally, the particular contents of consciousness are
unpleasant enough to cancel out this basically
positive reaction, as usually happens in the case
of pain experience, for instance. One perhaps sees
a similar ‘enticement’ mechanism at work in the
case of sex; nature entices us to use our sexual
organs so that the race proliferates by making
their use highly rewarding. It seems clear that
conscious sensations play a vital role in this case.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Conclusion
Once art is brought into the realm of science,
several classical claims about it can be seen to be
empirically testable. In his landmark work, Art and
Experience, for example, John Dewey argues that
aesthetic experience requires dissolution of self
and object as separate existences. This stands in
contrast with scientific observation, he notes, which
calls for as much separation from subjectivity as
possible in perceptual judgments. Empirical obser-
vation for the purposes of science idealizes a
form of perception cleansed of the observer’s
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beliefs. Any significant level of projection or inter-
pretation skewed toward personal preferences,
tastes, emotions, or remembrances is considered
as tainting, or even invalidating, scientific observa-
tions. On the contrary, aesthetic experience
depends, both ontologically and epistemologically,
on such subjective contributions. Conscious or
not, these sorts of differences should be quite
measurable as differences in brain activity.
The hypothesis that specialized brain activity
can be directly correlated with specific sorts of
aesthetic responses received some confirmation
by a recent experiment conducted by Kawabata
and Zeki using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) to locate and quantify what they
term ‘neural correlates of beauty.’ Prior to being
scanned, their subjects classified paintings of dif-
ferent genres (abstract, still life, portrait, and land-
scape) as beautiful, neutral, or ugly. Subjects then
viewed the same paintings while in the fMRI scan-
ner. Distinct, specialized areas of the brain were
found to be activated when perceiving different
genres of painting. More interestingly, indepen-
dent of the genre of the perceived painting, the
orbitofrontal cortex was found to be differentially
activated when the subject was perceiving beauti-
ful or ugly stimuli, while the motor cortex was
found to be activated differentially during percep-
tion of paintings as beautiful or ugly. Activity in
the orbitofrontal cortex increased during the per-
ception of beautiful stimuli and decreased in the
case of ugly stimuli. The reverse was seen to be
true of the motor cortex. Stimuli perceived as ugly
produced the most activity while stimuli judged to
be beautiful the least. That finding perhaps helps
explain why aesthetic perception can sometimes
have a curiously paralyzing effect on us, as Sten-
dahl noted. Typically conscious experience induces
one to act, whereas aesthetic experiences ‘stop us
in our tracks’; we end bodily motion to engage in
deeper contact with the artwork. Aesthetic appre-
ciation of this sort is not goal-oriented. If any
action is motivated by aesthetic appreciation, it is
to move closer to the art object, or at least to
prolong the experience.
One often-heard objection, especially from the
art establishment, is that neuroaesthetics is ‘reduc-
tionist,’ in the sense that its proponents intend to
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of are somehow unreal or unimportant, whereas
the underlying brain events, as described by brain
scientists, contain all the reality there is to them.
The critics are forgetting, however, that science
need not work this way. There is no reason in
principle why understanding the phenomena
underlying something should make our existing
ways of understanding that thing go away. This
only tends to happen when serious flaws are dis-
covered in the existing ways of thinking and
speaking, and this is not in general what is being
proposed by the neuroaestheticians. This sort of
noneliminative reduction can serve to ground
aesthetic experience more firmly in scientific
perceptives, making it more solid and real rather
than less.
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